Intergovernmental grants are based on the interrelated choices of: (i) the national government deciding whether to offer the grant; (ii) the national government determining grant conditions; (iii) the subnational government deciding whether to accept the grant; and (iv) the subnational government determining policy, including spending levels, upon grant receipt. Empirically and theoretically, scholars often study these decisions separately, leading to an incomplete understanding of grant-related behavior. This article develops a noncooperative game theoretic model that simultaneously captures all four of these decisions. This approach helps to better explain puzzles surrounding intergovernmental grants, including the 'flypaper effect, ' asymmetric responses of recipient governments to grant increases and decreases, the grant-acceptance decisions of subnational governments, and tradeoffs between the size of grants and the strings that are attached.
First, policymakers at the donor level (here described as the national government) must decide whether or not to offer a grant. Their other options include offering no grant or providing goods and services directly, without reliance on other levels of government. Second, the national policymakers must decide what conditions (if any) to attach to the receipt of grant funds, in terms of how the funds are to be spent and what policies the recipient government must follow. Third, the recipient government (here described as the subnational government) must often decide whether or not to seek or accept the grants. Finally, the subnational government must decide how to set policy and spend grant funds.
Empirically, each of these four decisions has received substantial attention. For example, studies of whether and where the U.S. Congress allocates grant funds often focus on coalition size, privileged positions of committee members and party leaders, or other national government concerns. 1 Attaching strings or conditions to grant funds can be done directly in related areas (such as with highway funds linked to state-set speed limits or substance abuse prevention grants tied to state attempts to reduce youth smoking), or in unrelated areas, sometimes through unfunded mandates (Posner 1998) . Scholarly work at the state and local level captures not only whether grants are sought and received (e.g., Stein 1984; Fossett 1990; Choi, Turner, and Volden 2002) , but also how recipient governments respond to grant funds. For example, there has been evidence of an asymmetric response to grant increases and decreases (Stine 1994; Gamkhar and Oates 1996; Volden 1999; Gamkhar 2000) and of a ''flypaper effect,'' with grant funds sticking where they hit instead of being spread across the state budget (e.g., Hines and Thaler 1995; Bailey and Connolly 1998; Deller and Maher 2006) . The theoretical bases for these empirical works have typically fallen into one of three categories. 2 Either implicitly or explicitly, scholars studying grant-making decisions by the national government rely on models of distributive politics (e.g., Weingast 1979; Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Dixit and Londregan 1995; Volden and Wiseman 2007) . Such models help scholars to determine when, where, and how grant funds are allocated. Those studying grant-making decisions at the state or local levels often rely instead on indifference curve models of spending with budget constraints from the classical public finance literature (e.g., Scott 1952; Wilde 1971) or on more political theories focused exclusively on politics within the recipient level (e.g., Romer and Rosenthal 1980) . The third broad category of theoretical work on intergovernmental grants cuts across these two levels, typically through reliance on principal-agent models (e.g., Chubb 1985) . Each of these approaches is problematic. Most simply, focusing only on one level of government neglects the interrelated decisions between the national and state governments. The size and conditions of the grant influence states responses; and how states will likely respond influences national policymakers' formulation of the grant in the first place. Moreover, these interrelated decisions are poorly characterized by a principal-agent approach. State governments in federal systems are not the same as national bureaucrats carrying out the wishes of national politicians. Rather, they have independent sources of financing and political power and must be responsive to their own constituents.
Treating the distinct steps of the grant-making process individually, whether empirically or theoretically, may result in an incomplete understanding of the politics of intergovernmental grants. For example, studies of grant funding or the mandates attached to grants must focus not only on the desires of coalitions of national politicians but also on likely state and local government responses. Similarly, how subnational governments respond to grant increases and decreases is likely related to the reasons for those increases and decreases at the national level.
This article presents a game theoretic model of intergovernmental grants that includes all four of the above choices, in order to more completely characterize this important fiscal arrangement within federal systems. In so doing, propositions are generated regarding when the national government offers grants, when grant sizes and mandates vary, when subnational governments apply for and accept grants, and how they alter their spending upon grant receipt. Policymakers throughout the model are assumed to care about the policy direction chosen, the credit they can generate from providing goods in the policy area, and the blame they face for the taxation necessary to provide goods and services. Implications of the model for studies of the flypaper effect, asymmetric responses to grant increases and decreases, the grant acceptance decision, and tradeoffs between grant sizes and grant restrictions are examined following the formal model, the analysis of which is broken into many sections detailing its assumptions, derivations, and propositions.
A Formal Model of Intergovernmental Grants and Political Decision Making
The model of federalism proposed here focuses on elected politicians in a national government and a subnational government competing with each other to claim credit for providing goods and services to constituents in a given policy area, and to set the direction of that policy. 3 This vertical competition within a federal system takes place through the choices of policy direction in a particular policy area and the level of spending in that area. The politicians are seeking to represent the desires of their constituents (presumably to gain reelection). Constituents benefit from spending in a particular program area but dislike the taxes they have to pay to bring about that spending. They also have preferences over the policy direction taken in the program area. The subnational government provides some level of funding for the desired goods and services and typically sets the direction that the policy will take in this area. For example, states and localities spend tax revenue and set policy regulations over environmental cleanup, police services, welfare programs, education, and health care. The national government can allow the subnational government to address policy concerns on its own, can join with the subnational government in providing goods jointly in order to gain some of the credit from the public, or can offer an intergovernmental grant to the subnational government (potentially with strings attached).
This process is modeled formally through a game structured as shown in figure 1 , which builds upon work by . There are two actors in the game, a national and a subnational government, acting in a federal system. 4 Although federal systems are made up of many states, cities, regions, etc., here I simplify to a single representative subnational government in order to provide a clear understanding of vertical competition without horizontal or multiple-level concerns. 5 Throughout the game, the subnational government is assumed to take some role in good provision-thus this article excludes policy areas such as national defense in which the subnational governments' role is limited, an acceptable assumption for present purposes because such policy areas tend not to contain intergovernmental grants. 6 The national government makes the first move in the game, choosing: to not become involved in the provision of the good, to become involved through direct joint provision of the good, or to offer an intergovernmental grant to the subnational government to aid in its provision of the good. These are typical choices made by the central government in federal systems-whether to leave the provision of education to states and localities or to offer a grant to increase the A c c e p t R e j e c t Figure 1 Grant provision game tree. 4 number of teachers and reduce class sizes, whether to provide a welfare program directly or fund it through subnational governments, whether to engage in environmental cleanup or to leave such cleanup decisions to the subnational levels.
If the national government takes no involvement in the provision of the good, the subnational government is left to choose a quantity of good provision (q S ) and the direction that the policy should take in that program area (y). This ''policy direction'' is simplified to be a choice on a one-dimensional policy line, with the subnational government potentially having a different ideal policy than the national government. The policy direction is modeled as separate from the amount of spending and may be thought of as capturing different preferences about how funds are spent. Subnational governments, for example, may prefer increasing teacher salaries, while the national government prefers mandatory testing of students; likewise, the governments may differ in preferences over how to best reduce pollution, keep the streets safe, or expand health care coverage. If the national government decides to provide the good jointly with the subnational government, the national and subnational governments sequentially choose the quantities of the good they each wish to provide. The subnational government is still allowed to dictate the policy direction. 7 If the national government decides instead to offer an intergovernmental grant, it must choose the size of the grant (g), and may place conditions on the grant in terms of the policy direction (y). 8 The subnational government can then choose to accept or reject the grant, given its policy restrictions. If the subnational government accepts the grant, it chooses the quantity of the good it will provide given revenue from the grant and any taxes it chooses to raise. If the subnational government rejects the grant, it provides the good on its own once again and can completely determine the policy direction chosen. As described earlier, the politicians in these two levels of government are essentially representative agents of their constituents. They benefit from providing popular goods, from keeping taxes low, and from choosing a policy direction reflecting constituent preferences. Specifically, the utility equations for the subnational and national governments, respectively, are as follows:
The first term in each of the utility equations captures the credit that voters give the governments for providing the good. The amount of credit is increasing in the total quantity (q S þ q N ) provided and in the level of public demand (d) for the good. The credit is divided between the subnational and national governments, with f C,S being the fraction of credit going to the subnational government and f C,N being the fraction going to the national government. The second term in each utility equation captures the blame associated with taxation. The amount of blame is increasing in the square of the level of total taxation (t S þ t N ), giving a large negative utility for over-taxation. Again, the blame is divided among the two governments, with the fraction f B,S going to the subnational government and the fraction f B,N going to the national government. In combination, the credit and blame terms reflect the scenario in which there is an ideal level of program spending somewhere between zero and infinity. At this ideal level, any less spending would give a net disutility from less credit for the good provision and any greater spending would give a net disutility from over-taxation.
9
The final term in each utility equation captures the disutility associated with taking a policy direction other than that desired by the government.
10 Each government has an ideal policy position on the one-dimensional line, x S for the subnational government and x N for the national government. The governments receive greater utility for policy outcomes (y) closer to these ideal points. For simplicity and without loss of generality, I assume that x N ! x S ¼ 0.
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As shown in figure 1 , the choice variables involve the quantities of goods provided, the policy direction, and the grant size. The choice of taxation levels comes about through a balanced budget assumption-taxes are raised to be just enough to provide the desired quantity of good or level of intergovernmental grant. Specifically, in the model, goods are assumed to have constant marginal (per unit) costs, which may differ between the state (m S ) and national governments (m N ), depending on their abilities at providing the specified goods or services. Program costs are paid for through taxes, such that, for the national government t N ¼ m N q N / N , and for the subnational government t S ¼ m S q S / S . The terms (05 1) capture the efficiency at which the governments are able to raise taxes. For ¼ 1, the government is able to raise taxes at a perfectly efficient rate. Lower values indicate inefficiency, such as with government waste or drags on the economy due to taxation or other limitations in abilities or tax capacity. The model allows for a distinction between the national and subnational governments in their abilities to raise taxes and to provide goods cheaply.
While the model does not explicitly include differences between the national and subnational governments in their spending preferences, such differences are implicitly at work in the marginal cost and tax efficiency parameters. Governments that can provide goods more cheaply or raise taxes more efficiently here prefer greater levels of taxing and spending.
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For the case of an intergovernmental grant (g40), the quantity of the good provided directly by the national government is zero (q N ¼ 0), and the level of taxation by the national government is simply based on the amount of the grant: t N ¼ g/ N . The subnational government receiving the grant thus does not need to raise as much in taxes. Its balanced budget equation, therefore, 6 becomes: t S ¼ (m S q S À g)/ S . In deriving the utility equations below, these taxation levels are thus inserted into equations 1 and 2.
It should be noted that this model involves neither monitoring nor nonsubstitution restrictions by the national government, found to be important elsewhere (e.g., Chubb 1985) . As a nonrepeated model with complete information, monitoring would play no role in this sort of model; and, as there is only one area of spending modeled here, substitution of grant funds is limited to cutting subnational taxes. Allowing the subnational government to make these tradeoffs between taxing and spending is important in allowing the model to capture the possibility of asymmetric responses to grant increases and decreases and the possibility of a flypaper effect.
The game is solved for a subgame perfect equilibrium, accomplished through backwards induction. The following three sections explore each of the three subgames that follow from the national government's choice of funding mechanism. Once those are solved, the initial choice by the national government is examined.
No National Provision Subgame
In the first subgame, only the subnational government provides the good, without the aid of an intergovernmental grant. Given no national provision (NNP), the subnational government receives full credit for spending, full blame for taxation, and the ability to set the policy direction. We, therefore, focus on the utility of the subnational government, as given in equation 1, now with f C,S ¼ 1, f B,S ¼ 1, q N ¼ 0, and t N ¼ 0. Thus, the subnational government is attempting to maximize:
Given the balanced budget assumption, the level of taxes can be expressed in terms of the marginal costs and relative tax efficiency, as described earlier. This yields:
The subnational government is attempting to maximize its utility with its choice of quantity of good provision (q S ) and policy outcome (y). Utility is maximized when:
As might be expected, the subnational government chooses the policy direction at its ideal point, and chooses a level of good provision that is increasing in public demand and tax efficiency, while decreasing in marginal program costs. These optimal choices yield a utility for the subnational government of:
The national government receives no credit or blame in this subgame, but does experience some disutility from the policy choice away from its ideal point. Thus:
Joint Provision Subgame
In this subgame, both the national and subnational governments provide the good and seek credit for its provision. I assume that the governments receive credit and blame in proportion to their quantities provided and their levels of taxation, respectively. 14 Thus
must be inserted into equations 1 and 2. Along with the balanced budget constraints, t N ¼ m N q N / N and t S ¼ m S q S / S , the utilities for the joint provision (JP) of the good become:
The game assumes that the national government acts first in choosing its quantity of good provision, and that the policy position choice is left to the subnational government, as explained ealier. Thus the maximization of utility is found through backwards induction based on the first order conditions, as shown in the Appendix. Assuming fairly equivalent abilities in raising taxes and in program costs ððm N S =2 N Þ<m S <ð3m N S =2 N ÞÞ, both levels of government will join in provision. 15 The equilibrium solution is given by the following:
By looking at comparative statics, we can see how the quantities of the good provided by the national and subnational governments change under varying conditions. Three relations are worth noting. First, both levels of government provide greater quantities of more highly demanded goods, because they receive more political credit for doing so. Second, each level of government provides a greater amount of the good when its own costs of provision decline and when the 8 other level's costs rise. This means that, in competition with one another, each government seeks to expand its good provision (and thus the credit it receives) when it gains a comparative advantage. Third, similarly, each level of government provides a greater quantity when its own tax efficiency rises and when the other government's efficiency declines. All of these findings are as we might expect.
Inserting the chosen quantities and policy outcome into the utility equations yields:
Intergovernmental Grant Subgame
In the third subgame, the national government offers a grant to the subnational government, which comes with strings attached in terms of restrictions on the policy direction chosen. Again, credit and blame are associated with the relative roles that the national and subnational governments play in good provision and taxation. Specifically, I assume:
As before, the blame for taxation is divided relative to the levels of taxation. The credit for good provision is divided in proportion to the size of the grant (g) and the total spending by the subnational government (m S q S ). The levels of taxation reflect the balanced budget conditions:
Inserting these into equations 1 and 2 yields:
The order of play in this subgame is such that the national government first offers a grant size g and policy proposal y to the subnational government. Then the subnational government decides whether to accept or reject the intergovernmental grant. If it accepts the grant, then it decides what quantity of the good to provide. If it rejects the grant, then it plays an identical subgame to the ''no national provision subgame'' described earlier.
This game is solved through backwards induction. Beginning with the grant acceptant subgame, the optimal choice of quantity is:
This is g(2 N À S )/(2m S N ) units greater than the quantity of good provided in the absence of any national government involvement. 16 This equation gives the first insight into the role of intergovernmental grants in the model:
The quantity of goods provided by a grant-receiving government increases in proportion to the size of the grant received. The effect of the grant is greater in regions where the costs of good provision are low, and where the subnational government is inefficient in raising taxes, relative to the national government.
Proof: Proofs of all propositions are given in the appendix.
This proposition indicates that recipient governments will differ in the effect that grants have on their levels of good provision depending on characteristics of taxation and costs within their regions. Subnational governments that can provide the good quite cheaply (m S low) will be able to provide more of the good in response to the intergovernmental grant. Those governments that have difficulty raising taxes on their own ( S low) will respond very favorably to the grant, increasing good provision greatly. This is because they were previously limited in their level of good provision due to their inability to raise taxes effectively. If they wish to receive a substantial portion of credit upon receipt of the grant, they cannot cut back own-source spending too dramatically.
Inserting the optimal choice of quantity from equation 13 into the subnational government's utility equation 11 yields:
The subnational government will accept the grant as long as this utility exceeds that from the subgame with no national provision, as described earlier and given in equation 5. As derived in the Appendix, the grant is accepted as long as:
Analyzing this finding yields the following proposition:
Proposition 2: All else equal, subnational governments will accept grants when: (a) the policy constraints imposed in grant conditions are small, (b) the size of the grant is large, (c) the subnational government is not able to raise taxes efficiently, (d) costs of good provision are large, and (e) public demand is low. Parts of this proposition are quite intuitive. When the grant comes with very few restrictions or when the grant is large relative to program costs, then the subnational government will accept the grant. Furthermore, because they are unable to provide a substantial level of the good on their own, subnational governments that have difficulty raising tax revenue will be especially eager to accept the revenue provided by the national government, as will those governments facing large costs for good provision. Finally, public demand plays an interesting role here. Subnational governments may turn down grants for programs that are highly demanded, because they do not wish to share the credit for their provision with the national government.
We now step backwards in the game to the national government's decision about the grant size to offer and the policy mandate to attach to the grant. Given the constraint imposed by equation 15, there are five conditions to consider. First, it may be the case that any grant that the national government is willing to offer will not be acceptable to the subnational government. Second, the constraint from equation 15 may be binding, with the policy direction chosen at the subnational government's ideal point (y ¼ 0). Third, the constraint may be binding with the policy direction chosen between the two governments' ideal points. Fourth, the constraint may be binding with the policy chosen at the national government's ideal point (y ¼ x N ). Finally, when the national government's ideal point is close to the subnational government's and the national government desires to offer a large grant, the constraint is no longer binding. Table 1 lists these five cases, the conditions under which they occur, the equilibrium grant sizes, and equilibrium policy constraints.
Put briefly, Case I, in which no grant is offered, occurs when the national government is not substantially better than the subnational government at raising 
Intergovernmental Grantstaxes-that is, when N 5(3 S /2). Case II occurs when the national government's tax efficiency is somewhat larger [when (3 S /2) N 2 S ]. Yet, here the national government's advantage is not so great that it can attach significant strings to how the grant money would be spent. Any such attempts would lead the subnational government to reject the (fairly small) grant, in favor of providing the good and setting the policy direction itself.
When the national government's tax efficiency is even greater, it offers a large enough grant that the subnational government accepts the funds, even with policy strings attached. Those policy constraints increase, along with the size of the grant and the degree of relative national tax efficiency, throughout Case III until, in Case IV, the policy constraint is such that the national government is able to secure its ideal policy. Throughout these two cases, the subnational government is made indifferent between accepting and rejecting the grant with its strings attached.
Finally, in Case V, the national government is so much more effective at raising tax revenue than is the subnational government, and their policy preferences are sufficiently aligned, that the national government offers its optimal grant size with restrictions that the policy choice be in line with national preferences (y ¼ x N ). Due to its limited ability to raise taxes on its own, the subnational government prefers grant acceptance over its other alternatives.
Taken together, these cases give us some insight into the size of intergovernmental grants: Proposition 3: All else equal, grant size will be larger when: (a) public demand for spending on the good is high, (b) costs of good provision by the subnational government are low, and (c) the national government is able to raise taxes efficiently.
It makes sense that the national government would provide a larger grant in areas highly desired by the public. This would be a good opportunity for national-level politicians to gain political credit. Likewise, when the subnational government is able to provide the good effectively (at a low cost), more substantial grants are offered in order to get a larger ''bang for the buck.'' Larger grants are also given when the national government can raise revenue effectively. Taken as a whole, these appear to be a form of ''cooperative federalism'' (Elazar 1962 (Elazar , 1966 Grodzins 1966) . The national government, in a better position to raise taxes, offers substantial grants to states and localities that are in a better position to provide goods and services at low cost. Yet, there is no assumption that the politicians in this model are in any way cooperative. Rather such behavior is a product of competitive forces, with each level of government seeking credit from good provision and trying to limit the blame that comes with taxation. Indeed, even with credit divided between the competing actors here, seemingly ''cooperative'' behavior results under the same conditions identified in the cooperative federalism literature.
Proposition 3 does not contain comparative statics results for how the grant size changes in response to changing tax efficiency at the subnational level. This is because the effects of such a change vary across the different cases. In Cases II and IV, larger grants are required when the subnational government's tax efficiency is high, in order to entice this government to accept the grant instead of providing the good on its own. In Cases III and V, however, larger grants are given when the subnational government's tax efficiency is low. In Case V, this is done as an attempt to gain a larger portion of the credit for the good provision. In Case III, the lower subnational tax efficiency allows the national government to place a greater restriction on the policy direction chosen, but such a restriction must be coupled with a larger grant to remain acceptable to the subnational government.
The equilibrium results within Case III, as well as across these cases, help us understand the nature of federal mandates attached to intergovernmental grants.
Proposition 4:
All else equal, mandates on grant recipients are more restrictive when: (a) public demand for spending on the good is high, (b) costs of good provision by the subnational government are low, (c) the national government is able to raise taxes efficiently, and (d) the subnational government is not able to raise taxes efficiently.
In Proposition 3, we found that larger grants are offered when public demands are high, when marginal costs are low, and when the national government is able to raise taxes efficiently. Because larger grants are more attractive to subnational governments, these same conditions allow more restrictive mandates to be attached to these larger grants. In addition, when the subnational government is not able to raise revenue effectively on its own, it finds intergovernmental grant revenue more attractive. National politicians are able to exploit this desire for grant revenue by imposing greater policy restrictions on the subnational government. Finally, in Cases IV and V, the policy restrictions are greater as the policy preferences of the national government diverge from those of the subnational government.
National Government's Funding Mechanism Choice
Having resolved the choices made in each of the subgames, we can now take a step backward in the game to determine whether the national government would prefer no national provision of the good, joint provision of the good with the subnational government, or funding through an intergovernmental grant. This choice is made through a determination by the national government as to which of these three options will yield the highest utility. As calculated in the appendix, Intergovernmental Grants 13 the national government chooses its funding mechanism based on the following conditions:
, and m N large
where m N is characterized as being ''large'' or ''small'' relative to the other parameters depending on the various cases of grant provision noted in the previous section. These broad conditions are illustrated in figure 2 , for an example in which national and subnational policy preferences are aligned (x N ¼ x S ).
In the lower-right portion of the figure, the subnational government can raise taxes more efficiently than the national government and has relatively low costs of provision. Because of these advantages, the subnational provision keeps the national 14 government from providing goods and services in this area. The opposite occurs in the upper-left part of the figure, where the national government, with its relative tax efficiency and lower-cost provision, crowds out the subnational government. In the upper-right portion of figure 2 there is some degree of parity in the taxraising and good-provision abilities of the national and subnational governments. Here, due to their competitive credit-claiming goals, both governments provide some of the goods and services, resulting in some redundancy and inefficiency. Finally, in the lower-left part of the figure, the national government is particularly effective in raising taxes while the subnational government is better at providing goods and services at a low cost. Given this combination, the national government offers an intergovernmental grant and the subnational government accepts the grant. These findings can be summarized as follows: Proposition 5: When one level of government is far more effective at raising revenue and providing goods and services than the other, the less efficient government does not take part in public good provision in that area. When their degrees of effectiveness are comparable, both levels of government provide goods and services. And when the national government has a relative advantage in raising taxes and the subnational government can more cheaply and effectively provide goods and services, intergovernmental grants are used.
The components of this proposition are quite straightforward. Put simply, each government does most what it does best. Such a finding follows in the tradition of public finance models dating back to Oates (1968) and Musgrave (1969) , which assess best areas of national and subnational spending, respectively. This overall pattern of public good provision also mimics that proposed by scholars of cooperative federalism. However, it is actually produced through noncooperative means. Politicians at each level of government are interested in receiving credit from providing goods and services and limiting the blame they face from taxation. These simple goals lead to the fairly efficient, and seemingly ''cooperative,'' behavior of Proposition 5.
Implications of the Model
Scholars of federalism have raised a variety of interesting questions about the use of intergovernmental grants. For example, why do grants have greater effects on recipient government spending in the targeted program area than would an equivalent increase in tax revenue? Why do recipient governments seem to cut program spending by less when faced with a declining grant than by the amount they raise spending upon a grant increase? Under which conditions do recipient governments accept grants in the first place? The following subsections explore these questions, explaining how the model advanced in this article gives insight in these areas and may be empirically tested in the future.
The Flypaper Effect
Initially studied through standard indifference curve analyses in economics (Scott 1952 , Wilde 1971 , intergovernmental grants were perceived to affect the budget constraints of recipient governments in ways similar to an increase in tax revenue at that level of government. Therefore, it was expected that grant revenues would simply reduce own-source revenues in the given program area, allowing across-the-board spending increases or tax cuts. 17 However, even early empirical work, such as that summarized by Gramlich (1977) , showed that recipient governments were not treating grant revenues in the same fashion as additional tax revenue. Rather, governments receiving grants in a particular program area would increase funding of that area, perhaps not by the entire amount of the grant, but by substantially more than expected by economic theorists. This finding was deemed the ''flypaper effect,'' that grant funds stuck where they hit. Numerous scholars have attempted to explain the flypaper effect theoretically, and empirically to isolate the conditions under which it is strong. Bailey and Connolly (1998) summarize the theoretical and empirical work on the flypaper effect. They note 10 existing theoretical explanations of the flypaper effect that fall into two broad categories. The first category entails complexities in the public policy process. The flypaper effect may arise due to the institutional structure of recipient governments, agenda setting, uncertainty, fiscal illusion, and other details of decision-making (Romer and Rosenthal 1980; Schneider and Ji 1987; Dougan and Kenyon 1988; Fossett 1990; Aronson and Munley 1996) . The second category of explanations relies on the fact that grants often require specific funding choices, such as the non-substitution of grant funds for own-source revenues, which may be monitored by the granting government (Chubb 1985) . Empirical analysis lends support to some of these theories, and generally shows that the existence and size of the flypaper effect vary across institutional settings and over time (Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal 1982; Wyckoff 1991; Benton 1992; Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley 1992; Ladd 1993; Becker 1996; Deller and Maher 2006) . This variance has not been explained systematically.
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The model presented above may shed some light on when and where the flypaper effect might occur. 19 In the simplest sense, recipient governments are shown in Proposition 1 to differ in their responses to intergovernmental grants. In particular, upon the receipt of a grant of size g, the recipient government increases its quantity of good provision by g(2 N À S )/(2m S N ). Were every dollar of the grant spent to provide additional goods, at a marginal cost of m S , then the quantity would increase by g/m S , which would only occur in the model for S ¼ 0.
Thus, the model shows that the flypaper effect is expected to be strongest where the recipient government is unable to efficiently raise taxes ( S low), and weakest in subnational governments with the greatest tax efficiency, relative to the government giving the grant. Because subnational governments' abilities to raise taxes can be assessed empirically (as Berry and Fording 1997 do for state governments), scholars should be able to examine this explanation of the flypaper effect systematically across subnational governments. For example, we might anticipate a larger flypaper effect for grants from the federal government with its massive tax base to poor localities than we would for grants from a state to its largest city. Hines and Thaler (1995) list a number of studies in which the flypaper effect was found. Their list is reconfigured here as Table 2 . Although more thorough empirical analysis is desirable in the future, the results of the table are largely consistent with the predictions of the above model. The most sizable flypaper effect, increasing spending by $1.06 per grant dollar, was found for a federal grant to West Virginia school districts. The smallest effect was for state and federal grants to large urban governments. Clustered between 0.40 and 0.65 are grants from the federal government to the states or from state governments to localities, as we might expect. Gramlich and Galper (1973) Federal and state grants to 10 large urban governments
0.25
Source: Hines and Thaler (1995) .
Intergovernmental Grants
In a more complex sense, however, the appearance of the flypaper effect may result under a variety of conditions in the model. According to Proposition 3, the donor government increases its grant size under a variety of conditions, such as when demand for the good increases. A number of these conditions correspond to those that would cause the subnational government to increase its spending even in the absence of an increased grant. For example, given an increase in public demand, or given a decrease in the marginal costs of good provision by the subnational government, the quantity of goods provided increases (even in the absence of a grant) and the grant size increases. This would give the appearance of a flypaper effect, even though the increase in the good provision would have occurred without the grant. 20 Under other conditions, such as a decline in the tax efficiency of the subnational government, the grant might increase while the subnational government's spending decreases. Under such conditions, less of a flypaper effect would be detected.
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Asymmetric Responses to Grants
With the federal government in the United States running deficits throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a variety of federal grants to states and localities were reduced, at least relative to inflation. A number of scholars found that, for many of these program areas, recipient governments replaced lost funds with their own revenues (Forrester and Spindler 1990; Stonecash 1990; Stotsky 1991) . Students of federalism started to speculate that there may be an ''asymmetric response'' to grant increases and decreases (Oates 1999) . The flypaper effect may cause a dramatic increase in spending upon receipt of a grant that is not similarly offset upon the removal of a grant. Just as with the flypaper effect, scholars attempted to determine when and why such an asymmetry might occur. Stine (1994) explores the response of local governments in Pennsylvania, finding mixed support for the asymmetry hypothesis. Gamkhar and Oates (1996) question Stine's approach and find no asymmetries across broad categories of grants. With regard to specific grant programs, Volden (1999) finds asymmetries under the AFDC welfare program linked to bureaucratic strength in the states, and Gamkhar (2000) finds asymmetrical responses to changing highway funding grants. This initial evidence points to the possibility that, as with the flypaper effect, the asymmetrical effects of grants might be specific to certain programs and conditions under which grant sizes change. The present theory complements such an empirical finding. As suggested earlier, conditions such as changing public demand and costs of provision might cause grant sizes and recipient government spending to rise in concert with one another. Other conditions, such as changes in the tax efficiency of the subnational government, may lead grants and other spending pressures to move in opposing 18 directions. Therefore, if a grant program is established or expanded in response to increased public demand in a given program area, but cut back or abandoned in response to a decrease in the national government's relative ability to raise taxes, then such an asymmetric response to changing grant conditions might occur. This may correspond to the finding of grant increases for popular programs in the 1960s and 1970s that were cut back in the face of federal deficits in the 1970s and 1980s (Stonecash 1990 , Weaver 1996 . On the other hand, a reverse of such reasons for grant changes could result in the appearance of no spending rises associated with grant increases and dramatic spending cuts associated with declining grants, similar to Stine's (1994) finding of Pennsylvania counties' responses to federal government aid.
The Grant Acceptance Decision
In addition to explaining behavior upon grant receipt, students of federalism seek to understand when governments apply for and receive grants in the first place. While many grants are quite beneficial and accepted by all subnational governments, other grants come with very costly regulations, mandates, and restrictions. Scholars have explored both economic and political reasons for recipient government choices. In his explanation of the flypaper effect, Fossett (1990) suggests that the uncertainty of whether grant funding will endure leads recipient governments to spend on the targeted program area rather than shifting funding priorities or cutting taxes, which may have to be adjusted back at great political cost when the grant funding is removed. Similarly, Stein (1984) speculates that such uncertainty may lead local politicians to be wary of grant funding in the first place, especially with regard to enhancing municipal public employment.
When this uncertainty is coupled with mandates and restrictions, it is not surprising that many potential grants go unclaimed. For example, there were a number of states that initially did not participate in the AFDC welfare program grants due to federal restrictions. More recent grants, such as those to place 100,000 new police officers onto America's streets and 100,000 new teachers into America's classrooms, were accepted by only a limited number of cities and school districts. A curious set of questions involve which subnational governments apply for such grants and why. Choi, Turner, and Volden (2002) ask these questions with a focus on the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program, for example. The present model gives some insight generally.
As shown in Proposition 2, there are a number of conditions that make grants more attractive to subnational governments. Of course, larger grants and those that impose fewer policy restrictions are attractive. Additionally, subnational governments that are inefficient at raising taxes are more likely to seek and accept grants. Cities, states, school districts, and so on that do not have a substantial tax base or an ability to raise revenue effectively will under-fund desired activities. Therefore, they will desire intergovernmental grants in order to increase their provision of government services and goods. As described earlier, these are precisely the types of subnational governments that increase their spending the most upon receipt of grants.
Moreover, those subnational governments with high costs and low public demand are more likely to accept intergovernmental grants. Regarding costs, for example, those cities with the highest costs for providing new police officers and those school districts with the largest teacher salaries will be more likely to accept grants for police and teachers, respectively, because they face the greatest need of grant funds. Taken together, these conditions describe how generalized and optional grant programs, in and of themselves, might be effective at targeting needy subnational governments. The subnational governments that are most likely to seek grants are often those most in need of grants-those that are limited in their abilities to raise revenues on their own, and those with the greatest costs of providing goods.
Tradeoffs Between Grant Size and Grant Restrictions
In 1996, when Congress was considering how to reform the AFDC welfare program, a number of governors made an interesting proposal. They suggested that they would be willing to accept smaller federal grants if they would be given greater flexibility in structuring their welfare programs. Given the continued federal deficits at that point in time, this proposal appealed to national politicians as well.
Such a coupling of a smaller grant with fewer federal mandates fits well with the model advanced here. Unlike the other cases of grant receipt in which the policy direction is set at the ideal points of either the national government or the state government, in Case III of the model a compromise is reached with the mandated policy being somewhere between the directions desired by the two levels of government. In the equilibrium of this case, when the states become relatively more effective at raising their own tax revenue, they desire less restrictive grant conditions, and are willing to accept a smaller grant as a means to achieve this goal. This combination of a lower grant and fewer restrictions is also appealing to the national government in this case, and is even more attractive when the national government is revenue constrained and when the program is declining in terms of public demand. Given the lack of popularity of AFDC in 1996, the continued federal deficits, and rising state revenues, the governors' proposal was a political winner for both levels of government. With welfare reform, credit could be claimed by both levels of government for any policy success, without additional blame that would have accompanied higher taxes.
Conclusion
This article advances a model of intergovernmental political competition in which national and subnational politicians seek to claim credit for providing popular goods, to avoid blame for the taxation necessary to pay for such goods, and to advance their policy agendas. These goals can be accomplished through the direct provision of goods or through the giving and seeking of intergovernmental grants. The model predicts conditions under which national politicians wish to offer intergovernmental grants, rather than leaving policy control solely to the subnational government or providing goods jointly with the subnational government. It specifies the size of such grants offered and the nature of the policy restrictions that the national government places on grants. And it details when subnational governments will seek grants and how their spending levels will be affected by such grants.
The findings of this article point to the possibility of intergovernmental grants as part of competitive federalism, rather than cooperative federalism. Viewing grants in this light may help students of federalism understand where to look empirically for conditions such as the flypaper effect and asymmetric responses to grant increases and decreases. It also enhances our knowledge of the likelihood of subnational governments to seek and accept grants, as well as our understanding of the restrictions and mandates that are placed on such grants. Most importantly, this article illustrates how studying the multiple and interrelated decisions of national and subnational politicians simultaneously in a single model lends new insight into longheld inquiries about intergovernmental grants.
Appendix No National Provision Subgame
With no national provision, the subnational government's utility equation becomes:
Inserting the balanced budget equation, t S ¼ (m S q S )/ S , yields:
The optimal choice of y is y Ã NNP ¼ 0. For the optimal choice of q S , we take the first derivative with respect to q S , set it equal to zero, and solve:
The subnational government's utility is thus:
Joint Provision Subgame Equations 7 and 8 are:
Once again, the subnational government's optimal choice of y is y Ã JP ¼ 0. Solving through backwards induction, we first examine the quantity choice by the state, based upon the given national provision. Thus we examine the first of the above utility equations, maximizing utility based on the choice of q S . The first order condition is:
Solving this for the choice of q S generates:
Taking the next step backward in the analysis, we insert this chosen quantity q S into the national government's utility equation, yielding the following maximization problem:
The first order condition for this maximization is:
Solving this for the choice of q N generates:
Inserting this optimal choice of national government's quantity back into the state government's quantity choice yields:
These choices of quantities are positive under the following conditions:
When these conditions are not met, only one government provides the good, as shown in figure 2 .
Inserting the chosen quantities and policy outcome into the above utility equations yields:
Equations 11 and 12 are:
Through backwards induction we first focus on the quantity decision of the subnational government:
Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition is evident from the following comparative statics:
Returning to the derivation, we insert this optimal quantity choice into the subnational government's utility equation to yield:
Intergovernmental Grants 23
The subnational government will accept the grant if this utility level is greater than that received by providing the good without any national governmental help or restrictions, derived earlier:
Thus the grant is accepted if:
Proof of Proposition 2
The grant is accepted when the imposed restrictions are less than y 
We now step back to the national government's choice of grant size and restrictions on the policy direction. There are five cases to explore:
To determine the range over which no acceptable grant will be offered, we examine the two binding constraints, making each of the governments at least as well off as they would be in the absence of the grant. Above, we derived this constraint for the subnational government, in terms of y Ã Accept grant . Even in the extreme case where y ¼ 0, the subnational government will still only accept grants that are sufficiently large: g ! 2d N S /m S . At the minimal grant level satisfying this equation, the subnational government's chosen quantity is:
Inserting these values for the policy direction, grant size, and quantity choice into the utility equation for the national government yields:
This value only matches or exceeds that in the no grant case (U Ã N NNP j ¼ Àx N ) where N ! (3 S /2). For N below this value, no grant can be offered that the subnational government will accept.
Case II: Constraint binding, y ¼ 0 For N ! (3 S /2), the national government can offer an attractive grant to the subnational government. Over the range of values in Case II, the policy direction is set at y ¼ 0, the grant size is the smallest that is acceptable to the subnational government g Ã ¼ (2d N S )/m S , and the quantity chosen is q
S . These are all derived earlier, and discussed as part of Case I. Comparative statics over the grant size in this case are as follows:
The national government's utility in this case is:
Boundary conditions between Case II and Cases III^IV For somewhat more efficient national taxation abilities, the national government prefers to offer a larger grant than in Case II, shifting the policy direction away from that desired by the subnational government. This occurs in Cases III-V. To determine the boundary between Case II and Cases III and IV, we examine the national government's utility equation, given the optimal quantity choice of the subnational government q 
This utility equation is maximized by the choice of g that solves the following first order condition:
In such a case, the grant size chosen is
Inserting this choice into the constraint of equation 15 yields:
This value is positive for N 42 S which defines the boundary between Case II and Cases III and IV.
Case III: Constraint Binding, 05y ¼ y* Accept grant 5x N This case occurs where N 42 S and where the desired policy direction of the national government differs substantially from that desired by the subnational government. Here, the policy direction mandated by the national government is somewhere between these two ideal points. As noted in the above discussion, here the grant size chosen is g Ã ¼ (2d N ( N À S )/m S ), and the policy direction is
Inserting this grant size into the subnational government's quantity choice yields:
Comparative statics over the grant size in this case are as follows:
Comparative statics over the policy direction are as follows:
Case IV: Constraint Binding, y ¼ x N For a closer alignment between the policy preferences of the national and subnational governments, the desired policy may be chosen at the national government's ideal point, with the grant size still constrained to be larger than desired by the national government in order the remain attractive to the subnational government. With y ¼ x N , the subnational government requires a large enough grant to continue to satisfy equation 15:
This is satisfied where the grant size is:
Inserting this grant size into the subnational government's optimal quantity choice equation yields:
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Case V: Constraint not binding, y ¼ x N In this final case, the national government's ideal grant size and policy mandate is such that it is sufficiently attractive to the subnational government. Therefore, the constraint in equation 15 is no longer binding. Here, the national government sets the policy direction equal to its ideal point, and chooses an optimal grant size based on the expected quantity choice the subnational government will select in response to the grant:
Inserting these conditions into the national government's utility equation yields:
Utility is maximized with respect to the choice of grant size as determined by the first order equation:
The optimal grant size is thus:
Inserting this grant size into the subnational government's choice of quantity equation results in:
Inserting these results into the subnational government's utility equation yields:
This utility is sufficiently large to induce grant acceptance iff:
This equation thus defines the boundary between Case V and Cases III-IV.
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Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition is evident from the above comparative statics over g Ã for each case.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proposition is evident based on comparative statics over y Ã from Case III and based on the cutpoints between Cases II and III, and between Cases III and V. The comparative statics within Case III are given above; the comparative statics between Cases II and III are trivial. Between Cases III and V, define the cutpoint 8. Here the intergovernmental grant is assumed to be a lump-sum grant. Future work exploring the differences between the use of block and matching grants within the context of the present model may be quite fruitful. 9. Clearly, other utility functions could be used to reflect these properties. These are used for ease of explanation and model tractability. 10. By simply adding this policy-based term to the utility equation, I am implicitly assuming that the public's credit and blame decisions are separable from the direction of the policy chosen. While this may not perfectly reflect reality, it does seem clear that politicians are able to claim credit for such outcomes as environmental cleanup and educational progress even if they do not choose the optimal sites to clean or subjects to teach. What this utility equation does allow, however, is some loss associated with not reflecting constituent policy preferences perfectly. 11. Goal conflict between the national and subnational government (Nicholson-Crotty 2004) thus occurs in this model where x N is large. 12. An alternative model with public demand for goods and services varying across the two levels of government would likewise capture such differences in spending preferences. All propositions given subsequently hold upon consideration of this alternative assumption. 13. All derivations are given in the Appendix. 14. This assumption of accurate assessment of credit for good provision thus differs from Bednar (2007) who explores the effects of uncertainty on the part of voters regarding which level of government should receive credit for good provisions. The accurate assignment assumption actually matches reality fairly well, as shown by scholarly evidence of public credit to governors and senators in rough proportion to state and national activities, respectively (see reviews and analysis by Atkeson and Partin 1995, 2001 ). Nevertheless, alternative assumptions biasing credit or blame assignment toward the national or subnational government yield substantively similar results to those presented subsequently, as long as blame increases in some proportion to taxation and credit increases in some proportion to quantity provided by the respective governments. 15. Where the subnational marginal costs are below this range, it is only beneficial for the subnational government to engage in provision. Likewise, for subnational costs above this range, only the national government will find good provision beneficial. This latter case is set aside here as we are focusing on policy areas with a substantial subnational involvement; but it is illustrated in figure 2. 16. This is an increase as long as S 52 N , a reasonable assumption. As we see below, no grants are offered and accepted over the range where this assumption is not met. 17. Of course, matching and block grants would differ in their effects. 18. But see Strumpf 's (1998) in terms of whether grant funds are spent in the targeted program area, in other areas, or in tax cuts. Here the only possibilities are spending in the given program area or decreasing taxes. While this may be viewed as a limitation, one can think of the taxation term as implicitly accounting for desired spending in other program areas. Just as with the program area under examination, spending in other areas is selected at the point that makes the government indifferent between greater spending and lower taxes. As such, the conditions under which grant funds would be diverted to other program areas are the same ones that lead to decreased taxes in the present model. 20. Careful and clever econometric analyses may be able to isolate each of these effects, if the relevant variables are available and able to be accurately measured. Knight (2002) provides a promising step in this direction. 21. This argument is somewhat similar to that advanced by Brennan and Pincus (1996) who make predictions about the flypaper effect given an endogenous choice of grant conditions by the federal government.
